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IQBALAND THE SLIDE TOWARD

RESTRICTIVE PROCEDURE
by
•
A. Benjamin Spencer

Last term, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court affirmed its
commitment to more stringent pleading standards in the ordinary federal
civil case. Although the decision is not a watershed, since it merely
underscores the substantial changes to pleading doctrine wrought in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, Iqbal is disconcerting for at least two
reasons. First, the Court treated Iqbal 's factual allegations in a manner
that further erodes the assumption-oftruth rule that has been the
cornerstone of modern federal civil pleading practice. The result is an
approach to pleading that is governed by a subjective, malleable
standard that permits judges to reject pleadings based on their own
predilections or "experience and common sense. " Such an approach
undermines consistency and predictability in the pleading area and
supplants, in no small measure, the traditional fact-finding role of the
jury. Second, the Court struck a blow against the liberal ethos in civil
procedure fry endorsing pleading standards that will make it increasingly
difficult for members of societal out-groups to challenge the unlawful
practices of dominant interests such as empl<ryers, government officials,
or major corporations. Thus, although Iqbal ultimately does not go
much further than Twombly in reshaping civil pleading standards, the
decision is an important milestone in the steady slide toward
restrictiveness that has characterized procedural doctrine in recent years.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,1 a
case that portended significant alterations to federal civil pleading
2
standards under Rule 8. Specifically, Twombly did away with the "no set of
3
facts" standard of Conley v. Gibson and introduced the notion that Rule 8
requires a claimant to plead facts showing plausible entitlement to relief
in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Thus was born plausibility
5
pleading. However, after Twombly there was some uncertainty regarding
whether the case signaled a new era in pleading similar to the seismic
shift in how courts approached pleading before and after the advent of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Many observers argued that
Twombly did not represent a major change in pleading doctrine and in
any event merely reflected the approach to pleading that was prevalent
6
among the lower federal courts. Others, including this writer, suggested
that Twombly was much more consequential than the Court itself was
7
letting on, at least from a doctrinal perspective if not also from a
8
practical perspective.
That debate has been settled. Last term, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the
Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that we are indeed in a new era
of pleading by ruling that, in a civil complaint, so-called well-pleaded
(read: non-conclusory) substantiating facts are essential to support
allegations of wrongdoing and convince a judge of the plausibility of
9
claims contained therein. One thing that is remarkable about this case is
the Court's decision to permit judges to disregard certain alleged facts
and use their "experience and common sense" to evaluate the plausibility
of a claim, 10 rather than holding them to the traditional and more
objective approach of determining whether the alleged facts, taken as

' 127 s. Ct. 1955 (2007).
FED. R. CN. P. 8(a).
' 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
' Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1955, 1966-67.
5
A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431-32 (2008).
6
See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1098
(2009).
7 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
93 VA. L. REv. IN BRIEF 135, 137-38 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf; Spencer, supra note 5, at 441-42; Leading Cases,
Federal jurisdiction and Procedure, Civil Procedure, Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REv.
305, 310-11 (2007); Posting of Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law, The .End of Notice
Pleading, http://michaeldorf.org/2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html (May 24,
2007, 7:35 AM) ("[Twombly] will likely do great damage in the lower courts.").
8
A. Benjamin Spencer, Pl.eading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 How.
LJ. 99, 157 (2008).
9
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).
2

10

Id.

2010]

THE SLIDE TOWARD RESTRICTIVE PROCEDURE

187

11

true, entitle the pleader to relief. Another remarkable aspect of the
decision is the Court's blatant departure from the role of neutral arbiter
to that of a pro-defendant gatekeeper, at least in the civil context. Both of
these developments are troubling because they foster an environment
that is increasingly hostile to civil claimants, particularly those seeking to
challenge the unlawful conduct of societal elites such as government
officials, large corporations, or employers. Below, this Article briefly looks
at the road to Iqbal, followed by a discussion of some of the unfortunate
legal developments that follow in Iqbafs wake.
II. PLEADING DOCTRINE THROUGH IQBAL
The history of federal civil pleading standards has been told too
many times to be repeated here. 1 Suffice it to say that the 1938 Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, coupled with the Court's decision in Conley v.
Gibson that a claim may not be dismissed unless there was "no set of facts"
13
that the plaintiff could offer to prove his or her claim, established a
system referred to as "notice pleading" in federal civil cases. 14 Under
notice pleading, a claimant was not required "to set out in detail the facts
15
upon which he bases his claim," all of the claimant's factual allegations
16
were to be accepted as true at the pleading stage, and the plaintiff was
entitled to all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the
17
picture presented by those facts. Further, as the Court most recently
18
affirmed in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, requiring particularized pleading, as
some lower courts at times had been doing, was inconsistent with the
official forms appended to the rules and the fact that the Rules expressly

11
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.l (2002) ("Because we review
here a decision granting respondent's motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all of
the factual allegations contained in the complaint.").
12
See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival ofFact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 439-40, 445-52 (1986); Spencer, supra note 5,
at 434-39.
1
' 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
14
Id. at 47 ("To the contrary, all the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement
of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests." (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a))). I have previously
remarked that notice truly has little to do with determining whether a statement of a
claim is sufficient. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 19 (2009).
15
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
16
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508 n.l.
1
' Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir.
2004) ("A motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(6) may be granted only if,
accepting all well pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would warrant
relief.").
18
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
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19

provided for such heightened pleading for fraud cases. It was also
inconsistent with the established process for changing the substance of
the Federal Rules, which was to be through rulemaking amendments and
20
not judicial interpretation.
Then came the Twombly decision. The Court in Twombly abrogated
the "no set of facts" language in Conley and presented a new
interpretation of Rule S's pleading standard that seemed to undo much
21
of what was previously understood about pleading doctrine. Instead of
disclaiming the need to plead detailed facts, the Twombly Court indicated
that stating a claim "requires a complaint with enough factual matter
(taken as true) to suggest" that the allegations of wrongdoing are true
and that "[£]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
22
above the speculative level." The Court spoke of "[t]he need at the
pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent
with)" liabili�, pushing the claim past "the line between possibility and
2
plausibility." As I have written elsewhere, offering such facts before
discovery begins seems particularly problematic for claimants alleging
24
concealed wrongdoing, and there may be some evidence to that effect."
Ironically, the tightening of pleading standards in Twombly was motivated
by a desire to prevent plaintiffs with unsubstantiated claims from
26
accessing the discovery process and its attendant costs, even though
such discovery is the very thing that might enable plaintiffs to adduce
27
facts that support their legal daims. Ultimately, notwithstanding a
8
subsequent seeming nod to the continuing vitality of notice pleading2
29
and the effort of some scholars to downplay Twombly's significance,
Twombly was a landmark decision that signaled a turn away from the
liberal ethos that simplified pleading was meant to reflect, toward a more

19

Id. at 513 & n.4.

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
21
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968-69 (2007) (citing Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
22 Id. at 1965.
" Id. at 1966.
24 Spencer, supra note 5, at 481-82.
5
2 Spencer, supra note 8, at 102, 141-42; Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on I2(b)(6) Motions,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) ("(T]he one area in which this study does
show a significant departure from previous dismissal practice is the civil rights field.").
26
Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 196�7.
Tl See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512
(2002) ("Before
discovery has unearthed relevant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define the
precise formulation of the required prima facie case in a particular case.").
28
Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007).
29
See Smith, supra note 6, at 1097-98.
20
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restrictive sentiment that saw access to court as something that needed to
30
be constrained for some number of plaintiffs.
With the arrival of Iqbal, we now have our first opportunity to see
how the Court interprets and applies what it wrought in Twombly. Iqbal
involved an action by a Pakistani national and member of the Muslim
faith who was arrested in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
and subsequently detained and designated as a "person of high interest"
31
to the federal government's investigation of the attacks. Iqbal alleged
that his designation and subsequent harsh treatment while in detention
were unconstitutionally discriminatory and that then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller were personally and
overtly complicit in developing and imposing the policy underlying his
treatment:
The complaint contends that petitioners designated respondent a
person of high interest on account of his race, religion, or national
origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments to the
Constitution. The complaint alleges that "the [FBI], under the
direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained
thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the
events of September 11." It further alleges that " [ t]he policy of
holding post-September-11th detainees in highly restnct1ve
conditions of confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI was
approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions
in the weeks after September 11, 2001." Lastly, the complaint posits
that petitioners "each knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject" respondent to harsh conditions of
confinement "as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his]
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate
penological interest." The pleading names Ashcroft as the
"principal architect" of the policy and identifies Mueller as
"instrumental
in
[its]
adoption,
promulgation,
and
32
implementation."
Ashcroft and Mueller, who, as high-level government officials, were
entitled to raise the defense of qualified immunity, moved to dismiss
these claims on the ground that Iqbal had failed to offer sufficient
allegations establishing their personal involvement m clearly
33
unconstitutional conduct.
The district court rejected their motion, but did so based on the
Conley "no set of facts" standard that was subsequently repudiated by the

30 A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 101, 116-17), avaiwbl,e at http://ssm.com/
abstract=l343129; Spencer, supra note 5, at 433.
" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009).
2
3
Id. at 1944 (citations omitted) (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury
Demand at ,r,[ 10-11, 47, 69, 96, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809:JG-SMG,
2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)).

" Id.
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Supreme Court in Twombly. The Second Circuit thus had to resolve
whether the motion to dismiss should be granted under the revised
pleading standards articulated in Twombly. The circuit court upheld the
rejection of the motion, finding that Iqbal did offer direct factual
allegations of Ashcroft's and Mueller's personal assent to the
discriminatory policy, and added:
34

[T] he allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller condoned and agreed
to the discrimination that the Plaintiff alleges satisfies the
plausibility standard without an allegation of subsidiary facts
because of the likelihood that these senior officials would have
concerned themselves with the formulation and implementation of
policies dealing with the confinement of those arrested on federal
charges in the New York <;:ity area and designated "of high interest"
in the aftermath of9/li.3"
In other words, the allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller condoned and
agreed to the discrimination was a factual allegation, and it was plausible
because these officials are likely to have been involved with the
formulation of that policy, if such a policy is indeed shown to have
existed.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Iqbal had failed to satisfy
the pleading burden described in Twombly. The Court embraced the core
components of Twombly that established plausibility pleading, to wit:
• [T] he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require
"detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.
• A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s)" devoid
of "further factual enhancement."
• To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face."
• A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
• The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability
requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.
• Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with"
a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between
36
possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief."'
" Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809:JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *29
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
,, Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2007).
'° Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (bullet points added) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)).
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In this manner, the new statements that will now comprise the prelude to
any federal civil pleading analysis were recited and enshrined.
The Iqbal opinion then turned to setting forth the components of
the "two-pronged approach" of Twombly. First, only "well-pleaded factual
3
allegations" are entitled to the assumption of truth. ; Such allegations,
said the court, are to be contrasted with "legal conclusions" or
" [t] hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
38
mere conclusory statements," which a court is free to disregard. Thus,
the initial step in the Twombly analysis is for the court to identify those
39
allegations that are not well pleaded and set them to the side. Second,
the court then determines whether the well-pleaded factual allegations
40
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. How are courts to make
this latter determination? The Court explained:
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not "show [n] "-"that the pleader
41
is entitled to relief."
Applying the first prong of this test to Iqbal's complaint, the Court
determined that the following allegations were not "well pleaded": that
Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously
agreed to subject [him ] " to harsh conditions of confinement "as a matter
of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin
and for no legitimate penological interest" and that "Ashcroft was the
'principal architect' of this invidious policy and that Mueller was
42
'instrumental' in adopting and executing it." In the Court's view, these
were "bare assertions" that "amount to nothing more than a 'formulaic
43
recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim."
Thus, the Court concluded, "the allegations are conclusory and not
44
entitled to be assumed true."
Having disposed of Iqbal's core allegations personally connecting
Ashcroft and Mueller with the alleged unlawful policy, the Court turned
to the matter of whether Iqbal's remaining allegations plausibly showed
entitlement to relief. Those remaining allegations that the Court
accepted as "well pleaded" were as follows:
1
'

Id. at 1950.
"" Id. at 1949.
39
Id. at 1950 (" [A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth." ).
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
2
'
Id. at 1951 (internal citations omitted) .
" Id.
44 Id.
40
41
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[T]he [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER,
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as
part of its investigation of the events of September 11. . . . [and]
[t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were 'cleared' by
the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and
MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11,
5
2001. 4

The Court found these allegations to be merely consistent with-rather
than suggestive of-wrongdoing by Ashcroft and Mueller, since, in its
view, there were "more likely explanations" for the disparate impact of
4
the law enforcement actions Iqbal challenged in his complaint. Thus,
the Court concluded that Iqbal "has not 'nudged [his] claims' of
7
invidious discrimination 'across the line from conceivable to plausible. "'4
III. FACT SKEPTICISM: ACCEPTING ONLY PLAUSIBLE
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE
Although Iqbal involves the application of pleading standards
developed previously in Twombly, the Iqbal Court's rejection of Iqbal's
core allegations as too conclusory to be entitled to the assumption of
truth reflects a disturbing extension of the Twombly doctrine in the
direction of increased fact skepticism. Twombly resulted in many changes
to federal civil pleading standards, including the retirement of Conley's
"no set of facts" standard, the revival of the need to plead substantiating
facts that show entitlement to relief, and the formulation of plausibility as
8
the relevant measure of a complaint's sufficiency.4 But it did not cast
aside the assumption-of-truth rule, which holds that a claimant's factual
allegations are entitled to be believed and accepted at the pleading
49
stage, though it arguably opened the door for a weakening of that
50
rule.
Iqbal is a clear challenge to the continuing vitality of the assumption
of-truth rule given the Court's poorly explained rejection of what were
undeniably allegations that were non-conclusory and factual in nature.
After detailing a discriminatory policy that the FBI was alleged to have
adopted and implemented, Iqbal asserted that it was Ashcroft who was
the "principal architect" of the policy and he claims that Mueller was
" Id. (citations omitted).
46
47
48

Id.
Id. (citations omitted) .

Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 1 27 S. Ct. 1 955, 1 964-69 (2007).
" Id. at 1 965. ("Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are
true (even if doubtful in fact)." (citations omitted)).
50
Spencer, supra note 1 4, at 8-9 (discussing cases suggesting that "the Twombly
Court's statements regarding plausibility have given some courts a basis for applying
more skepticism to factual allegations than the assumption-of-truth principle would
seem to allow").

2010]

THE SLIDE TOWARD RESTRICTIVE PROCEDURE

193

"instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation,"
51
adding that both "approved" and "agreed to" the policy. These are not
conclusory assertions but rather plain-English descriptions of the
phenomena they attempt to describe. There can be no question that if I
were to say "Mr. Smith was the 'principal architect' of the Chrysler
building," that would be a non-conclusory factual claim, as would the
statement that "Ms. Smith ' approved' the design plans for the Chrysler
building." These statements are factual because they make claims about
what transpired and who took certain actions. Thus, the Court had no
problem accepting as factual and non-conclusory Iqbal's allegation that
"[t]he policy of holding post-September-11 th detainees in highly
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI
52
was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER."
To see through the Court's attempt to classify Iqbal's allegations
about Ashcroft and Mueller's relationship with the alleged discriminatory
policy as conclusory, we need to have a clear sense of what a conclusory
or "bald" allegation is. A conclusory claim is one that uses legal
terminology to describe conduct rather than factual statements. That is,
rather than describing what happened from a reporter's perspective
the who, what, when, where, and how-a conclusory assertion takes the
desired legal conclusion one wants attached to the occurrence and uses it
to describe the occurrence itself. For example, a conclusory way to allege
that "the defendant crossed over the yellow line and collided with my
vehicle, causing the plaintiff various injuries" would be to assert that "the
53
defendant negligently caused injury to the plaintiff."
In the
discrimination context, a conclusory assertion might be that "the
defendant discriminates in hiring decisions," rather than, "the defendant
systematically rejects Hispanic applicants with qualifications similar to
those of non-Hispanic applicants that it hires." The latter statement
reports facts; the former statement substitutes a legal characterization of
those facts and dispenses with factual reportage. Non-conclusory factual
claims make assertions about what happened without regard to the legal
characterization or consequences of those occurrences or omissions: the
defendant "purchased" this product; the defendant "did not attempt to
assist the plaintiff'; the defendant "fired" the plaintiff, et cetera. In other
words, allegations comprised of subjects and verbs, not just legal
adjectives and adverbs are non-conclusory.
The question for one scrutinizing Iqbal is whether an assertion that a
person "agreed" to do something, or "approved" of something, is
conclusory or factual. If those terms are used to report the fact that the
individual in question gave her assent, there would not appear to be a
51

First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 32, at 4-5, 1 7, 33.
Iqbal, 1 29 S. Ct. at 1 951.
5 3 Form 1 1 , which sufficiently alleges a simple negligence claim, goes beyond this
by describing how the defendant injured the plaintiff: by hitting him with a vehicle.
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 1 1 ("On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor
vehicle against plaintiff.").
52
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more specific, non-conclusory, way to communicate such information
other than to use the terms common to that purpose, such as "approval"
or "agreement." Alleging that a defendant "approved" something is non
conclusory because it does not make a claim about the legal character or
consequences of the defendant's assent, but rather simply reports its
presence. Thus, again, when the Iqbal majority accepts Iqbal's allegation
that " [ t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were 'cleared' by the FBI
5
was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER," 4 it is
acknowledging that claims of approval are not conclusory per se.
How then should we understand the Court's prior rejection of
Iqbal's allegations connecting Ashcroft and Mueller to the discriminatory
policy given the use of similar terms of "agreement" or equally factual
and non-conclusory terms such as "principal architect" or being
"instrumental" in the policy's development and implementation?"'' It
cannot be, as the Court claims, that these statements are too "bald" and
conclusory to be accepted as true given that the allegations describe what
is alleged to have occurred in similar fashion as the accepted allegation
that those defendants "approved" the policy of holding detainees in
56
highly restrictive conditions. In other words, the statement "the
defendants approved the policy of holding post-September-11th
detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement" and the
statement "the defendants approved the policy of subjecting defendants
to harsh conditions of confinement solely based on their race, religion,
and/or national origin" are offered at equal levels of specificity; one
cannot be deemed too bald and conclusory, and the other well pleaded,
based on any sensible understanding of those concepts, given the
57
statements' common reliance on the term "approved."
Since the conclusory label cannot credibly be applied to Iqbal's
rejected allegations as a valid rationale for discarding them, something
54

Iqbal, 1 29 S. Ct. at 1951 (emphasis added) .
Id.
56 Id.
5
i This is the point made by Justice Souter in his Iqbal dissent ,vhen he wrote:
"[T] he majority's holding that the statements it selects are conclusory cannot be
squared with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as
nonconclusory. For example, the majority takes as true the statement that '[t] he
policy of holding post-September-1 1 th detainees in highly restrictive conditions· of
confinement until they were "cleared" by the FBI was approved by Defendants
ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 1 1 ,
2001.' . . . If, as the majority says, these allegations are not conclusory, then I cannot
see why the majority deems it merely conclusory when Iqbal alleges that (1) after
September 1 1 , the FBI designated Arab Muslim detainees as being of 'high interest'
'because of the race, religion, and national origin of the detainees, and not because
of any evidence of the detainees' involvement in supporting terrorist activity,' and (2)
Ashcroft and Mueller 'knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed' to
that discrimination. By my lights, there is no principled basis for the majority's
disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to their subordinates'
discrimination." Id. at 1961 (Souter, ]., dissenting) (citations omitted) .
ss
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else must be at play. I submit that what the Court is revealing in its
rejection of Iqbal' s factual allegations regarding the involvement of
Ashcroft and Mueller in shaping the policy is that it wants to know Iqbal's
58
basis for making such factual claims about those two officials. That is,
the Court is seeking evidence to substantiate the factual assertion of
Ashcroft and Mueller's design of, and assent to, the discriminatory policy.
Had Iqbal made allegations identical to those that the Court rejected but
also referred to, and attached, a memo to the complaint from Mueller
describing and imposing the discriminatory policy, the Court certainly
59
would not have still treated Iqbal's allegations as inadequate. Indeed, a
recent Ninth Circuit opinion applying Iqbal suggests as much, noting that
Iqbal's complaint failed because "Iqbal's complaint contained no factual
allegations detailing statements made by Mueller and Ashcroft regarding
discrimination."60 The Iqbal majority is thus not using "conclusory" to
mean legalistic allegations lacking factual content, but rather has defined
a conclusory assertion as one that lacks evidence under circumstances in
which the Court feels that such evidence is required.
This is where context comes into play. In certain contexts, the Court
does not feel that additional evidence is required because the factual
assertion is not controversial, it is expected, or it is self-evident from the

Justice Scalia vocalized this interest during oral argument of Iqbal, stating, "I
don't know on what basis any of these allegations against the high-level officials are
made." Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009)
(No. 07-1015) .
'° Clearly, plaintiffs would not have access to such a "smoking gun" document
prior to discovery absent a whistleblower or leak of the document to the press or the
public. Indeed, it is plaintiffs facing such information asymmetry who will be
burdened most significantly by the fact skepticism endorsed in Iqbal.
00
Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 975 (9th Cir. 2009) . "Here, unlike Iqbal's
allegations, al-Kidd's complaint 'plausibly suggest [s] ' unlawful conduct, and does
more than contain bare allegations of an impermissible policy. While the complaint
similarly alleges that Ashcroft is the 'principal architect' of the policy, the complaint
in this case contains specific statements that Ashcroft himself made regarding the
post-September 11th use of the material witness statute. Ashcroft stated that
enhanced tactics, such as the use of the material witness statute, 'form one part of the
department's concentrated strategy to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected
terrorists off the street,' and that ' [a]ggressive detention of lawbreakers and material
witnesses is vital to preventing, disrupting or delaying new attacks.' Other top DOJ
officials candidly admitted that the material witness statute was viewed as an
important 'investigative tool' where they could obtain 'evidence' about the witness.
The complaint also contains reference to congressional testimony from FBI Director
Mueller, stating that al-Kidd's arrest was one of the government's anti-terrorism
successes-without any caveat that al-Kidd was arrested only as a witness.
Comparatively, Iqbal's complaint contained no factual allegations detailing
statements made by Mueller and Ashcroft regarding discrimination. The specific
allegations in al-Kidd's complaint plausibly suggest something more than just bare
allegations of improper purpose; they demonstrate that the Attorney General
purposefully used the material witness statute to detain suspects whom he wished to
investigate and detain preventatively, and that al-Kidd was subjected to this policy." Id.
(citations omitted) .
58
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perspective of the Court. 1 Conversely, when the factual assertion is
thought to be "unrealistic," "nonsensical," or "extravagantly fanciful,"62
more evidentiary facts must be offered to make the factual assertion in
question believable or "plausible." Thus, when the Iqbal majority accepts
the allegation that Mueller "approved" the policy of holding post
September-11th detainees in highly restrICUve conditions of
confinement, but rejects the allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller
"approved" the discriminatory policy, the former assertion is consistent
with the Iqbal majority's understanding about what the FBI Director and
Attorney General would approve, while the latter is inconsistent with
their settled expectations. As such, the latter assertion requires additional
evidence to be taken seriously and accepted as true.
At bottom, then, the Court's rejection of certain factual allegations
as "too conclusory" is really a statement that (1) the allegations are
factual claims that assert the unexpected, particularly about certain kinds
of defendants-government officials (Iqbal) or major corporations
( Twombly) for example; (2) as such, the allegations require additional
supporting facts to be believed; and (3) such facts are lacking in the
claimant's statement of his claim. Needless to say, this attitude towards
factual allegations is inappropriate; rejecting facts because they report
occurrences that members of the Court would find to be out-of-step with
their expectations regarding an official's behavior is a complete violation
of the assumption-of-truth rule. The whole point of the rule is to obligate
courts to acce�t factual claims regardless of how fanciful or far-fetched
3
they might be, ' and then make an assessment of whether the defendant
is entitled to relief. If what he says happened, happened, there will be
6
subsequent opportunities to put the plaintiff to proof. 4 Lawsuits are all
61

See Spencer, supra note 14, at 1 3-18 (explaining how presumptions of
propriety or impropriety attach to various factual circumstances based on their
consonance with our ordinary understandings about such occurrences).
62 Iqbal, 1 29 S. Ct. at 1 95 1 . It is interesting that the Court felt the need to
expressly clarify that it was not discarding Iqbal's claims on the basis that they were
"unrealistic," "nonsensical," or "extravagantly fanciful," suggesting some insecurity on
its part regarding the credibility of its stated rationale.
" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1 955, 1965 (2007) (" [A] well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts
is improbable, and 'that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" (quoting Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ) ) .
'" See, e.g. , FED. R . CIV. P. 5 6 (permitting litigants to seek judgment on claims that
lack factual support after the opportunity for discovery) . See also Twombly, 1 27 S. Ct. at
1976 (Stevens, ]., dissenting) ("Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal
Rules, the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in. The
merits of a claim would be sorted out during a flexible pretrial process and, as
appropriate, through the crucible of trial.") ; Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506, 5 1 2-13 (2002) . "This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal
discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues
and to dispose of unmeritorious claims. . . . 'The provisions for discovery are so
flexible and the provisions for pretrial procedure and summaryjudgment so effective,
that attempted surprise in federal practice is aborted very easily, synthetic issues
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about claiming the unexpected and seeking redress for deviations from
legal norms and acceptable standards of conduct. A pleading standard
that permits courts to disbelieve factual claims because they are felt to be
extremely atypical deviations, is fundamentally at odds with our norms
regarding access to court and presents a cruel and seemingly
insurmountable obstacle to certain claimants at the outset of litigation.
By making the ultimate plausibility of a claim depend in part on the
credibility of underlying factual allegations, the Iqbal Court is also
treading on the traditional province of the jury. One of the bases for the
assumption-of-truth rule is that it is for the jury to determine questions of
fact, including making determinations about which facts to believe and
which factual claims to discredit, based on the evidence presented at
trial. By permitting courts to refuse to accept factual allegations by
labeling them conclusory, simply because they lack additional evidentiary
details that would render them more believable, the Court empowers
judges to preempt the jury's assessment and substitute their own
judgments regarding the credibility of factual claims. This is not
consistent with the jury right, as Professor Thomas has argued
65
elsewhere.
IV. PATRICIAN BIAS: IQBAL AND THE RESTRICTIVE
ETHOS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
Beyond constituting a violation of the assumption-of-truth rule and
interfering with the jury right, the Iqbal majority's new fact skepticism is
problematic because it derives from, and gives voice to, what appears to
be the institutional biases of the Justices, as elite insiders with various
presumptions about the conduct and motives of other fellow societal
elites. This bias reveals itself when plaintiffs draw factual inferences that
the Justices feel are less likely explanations than inferences that their own
experience would suggest. For example, in Iqbal, although the majority
acknowledges that the alleged facts are consistent with "petitioners'
purposefully designating detainees ' of high interest' because of their
race, religion, or national origin," they assert that there are "more likely

detected , and the gravamen of the dispute brought frankly into the open for the
inspection of the court."' Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1 202, at 76 (2 ed. 1 990) ) .
65
See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss ls Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN.
L. REv. 1 85 1 , 1 882 (2008) . "Where the Court first strays from the requirements of the
Seventh Amendment in Twomhly . . . is where it permits courts to consider only
plausibl.e inferences from the facts that favor the plaintiff. This determination
necessarily permits a court to assess the plausibility of the inferences that arise from
the facts alleged by the plaintiff. This was not permitted under the common law.
Next, the Court also strays from the Seventh Amendment's command when it has
told the courts to also review plausible inferences that favor the defendant and weigh
those against plausible inferences that favor the plaintiff. These were all decisions
that were reserved for the jury at common law." Id. (citations omitted) .
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explanations" of the officials' conduct. The Iqbal majority goes on to
explain that the "obvious alternative explanation" for the challenged
arrests is that because the perpetrators of the September 1 1 th attacks
were "Arab Muslim hijackers," the arrests "were likely lawful and justified
by [Mueller's] nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were
illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections
to those who committed terrorist acts," and that " [i]t should come as no
surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and
detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would
67
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims."
Beyond the fact that Iqbal is Pakistani, not Arab-a distinction the
Court does not bother to notice-what makes this alternative explanation
"obvious" and "more likely"? Does the Court actually know that Director
Mueller had a "nondiscriminatory intent" as it asserts in Iqbal? Clearly the
Court is drawing on its "experience and common sense," as it indicated
68
would be necessary. But what needs to be understood is that the Court's
"experience and common sense" is not universal but rather is shaped by
their perspective and bias as societal elites who suppose that such
69
discrimination is rare.
This insider or patrician bias has revealed itself in other cases as well.
In Twombly, although the Court accepted that the facts described were
consistent with the presence of an unlawful agreement to restrain trade,
its perspective led it to prefer the alternate possibility that "natural"
market forces explained the behavior,7° or as the Iqbal Court put it,
"unchoreographed free-market behavior" was the "more likely"
71
explanation. Scott v. Harris--a case involving claims of a police officer's
use of deadly force to end a high-speed vehicle chase-presents another
72
example of this bias. There, the Court sidestepped the traditional
requirement of accepting the plaintiff's versions of the facts, in the
context of a defendant's motion for summary judgment, by ruling that its
"' Iqbal, 1 29 S. Ct. at 1 951.
67 Id.
08 Id. at 1950.
69
See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1 1 54
(2008) (" [T]he courts tend to reflect the insider view that discrimination is rare and
that most claims are meritless, rather than the opposing view that discrimination is
peivasive.") ; Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Emplayment, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 937 (2006) (" [I] n addition to deference and a commitment
to employment at will, courts also have an ideology that discounts the possibility of
discrimination in race and national origin cases." ) .
70 Bell At!. Corp. v . Twombly, 1 27 S. Ct. 1955, 1971-73 (2007).
71 Iqbal, 1 29 S. Ct. at 1950. The Court also betrayed similar pro-corporate
presumptions in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. unith Radio Carp., 475 U.S 574
(1986) , when it endorsed the following sentiment: "'The predation-recoupment
story . . . does not make sense, and we are left with the more plausible inference that
the Japanese firms did not sell below cost in the first place. They were just engaged in
hard competition.'" Id. at 591 n.1 5 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1 , 27 (1984) ) .
" 1 27 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
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own view of the record conclusively demonstrated the falsity of the
73
plaintiff's factual claims. Specifically, the Scott majority said that a factual
dispute is not "genuine" if the plaintiff's version of the facts "is blatantly
4
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it."'
The majority went on to base its rejection of the plaintiff's claim-that he
was not driving in a manner that endangered human life-on its
interpretation of a videotape that captured a police chase involving the
75
plaintiff. Taking up Justice Breyer' s invitation-to view the tape and
76
judge Scott's conduct for themselves -three researchers conducted a
study in which 1,350 diverse members of the public were asked to view
77
the tape and share their perspectives. Not surprisingly, although a
majority of respondents reached similar conclusions as the Scott majority
after viewing the tape, others reached conflicting conclusions, with
respondents' interpretation of the videotape tending to vary according to
an array of demographic and personal characteristics including race,
78
socio-economic status, and political party identification.
What we see in these opinions is the Justices' willingness to prefer
their own interpretation of facts over other interpretations, leaving no
room for the possibility that other understandings may have validity.
9
Further, these Justices appear to not be cognizant of (or concerned
with) the fact that their own views are connected to the biases they have
as relatively well-to-do societal elites who lack the diversity and
80
experiences that a civil jury might better represent. Indeed, an
81
important function of the jury is to screen out this institutional bias,

Id. at 1776.
Id.
1, Id.
6
7
Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring).
77 Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive !!liberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009).
78 Id.
79 I should note that at least Justice Scalia seems to have acknowledged the elite
bias of the Court: "When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with
the knights rather than the villeins-and more specifically with the Templars,
reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's Members
are drawn." Romer v. Evans, 5 1 7 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia,]., dissenting).
80
As one scholar has noted, " [a] ll nine of the Justices of the late Rehnquist
Court were graduates of elite schools with either little practice experience or practice
experience largely limited to constitutional litigation or defense-side civil litigation."
Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing
Theme in the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1117 n.66 (2006).
Others have similarly commented. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About
Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 146, 188-92 (1998) ("O] udicial review is
systematically biased in favor of culturally elite values . . . . Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, indeed of any state or federal appellate court, are overwhelmingly
upper-middle or upper-class and extremely well educated, usually at the nation's
more elite universities.").
81
Alexandra Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 589 (2008)
("The jury trial . . . helps avoid the systemic bias that might develop if all cases were
13
14
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making it even more disconcerting that the Iqbal decision gave judges
more power to scrutinize facts at the pleading stage.
This insider bias and its affirmation in Iqbal are quite dangerous and
alarming developments in the civil justice arena. In preyious writings, I
have suggested that the Twombly decision reflected a shift toward a
82
restrictive ethos in civil procedure, meaning an ethos oriented more
towards protecting the interests of defendants-particularly those from
the dominant or commercial class-against the civil claims of members
83
of societal out-groups. For example, employees who may have suffered
unlawful discrimination will find it more difficult to state a claim under
Twombly when the facts needed to satisfy the plausibility standard are
unavailable to them. The circumstance is similar for putative plaintiffs
seeking to pursue conspiracy claims if they lack particulars that might
substantiate the claim of an agreement. Put simply, the Twombly approach
to pleading represents a move in a restrictive direction because it makes
it more difficult for claimants to get their claims into court.
Iqbal ratifies the Court's commitment to a more restrictive approach
to pleading but it also portends something darker and more ominous.
Iqbal reflects a certain judicial mood toward litigation, an attitude of
hostility and skepticism toward supplicants with alleged grievances
against the government or against the powerful who make up the
84
dominant class. Increasingly, members of the Court in cases like Iqbal
and Twombly appear to see allegations not through the lens of detached,
impartial observers, but rather through the eyes of conforming social
elites. Thus, corporations are presumed to operate in legitimate ways
motivated only by the quest for lawful profit; law enforcement and other
government officials are presumed to operate by-the-book in a focused
mission to protect innocents from the multitude of deviants; and
employers are presumed to make hiring, firing, and promotion or
transfer decisions based wholly on merit rather than on prejudice against
members of various protected classes. Such a perspective ends up
favoring civil defendants, at least when they are arrayed as adversaries

decided by professional judges . . . . [T]he introduction of democratic decisionmakers
avoids the bias of an entrenched judicial elite.").
82
Spencer, supra note 30, at 1 1 6-17; Spencer, supra note 5, at 433.
83
Spencer, supra note 30, at 1 1 7-19.
84
Professor Siegel, in a study of the Court's hostility to litigation during the
Rehnquist era, made the following observation: "In myriad ways, the Court has made
life very difficult for civil plaintiffs. To take but a few examples, the Court has
narrowly construed statutes and case law to reduce and eliminate remedial options. It
has protected governments and governmental officials from financial liability
through expansive immunity doctrines and cramped interpretations of the federal
fee-shifting statutes. It has consistently enforced form arbitration agreements that
shift cases from courts to alternative forums without regard for the practical
consequences to potential plaintiffs. And it has birthed novel constitutional
limitations on the scope of recoverable damages." Siegel, supra note 80, at 1 1 1 7-18
(citations omitted).
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85

against members of various societal out-groups. Such a perspective is
also inappropriately naive about the very real existence of corporate and
86
official misconduct that has existed in the past, and that may be
reflected in some-of the complaints the Court's stricter pleading standard
will tend to reject.
V. CONCLUSION
The charges of bias leveled against the Iqbal Court herein will
certainly be decried and denied by most. But it seems apparent that the
Court is treating clearly factual allegations as conclusory solely on the
ground that it does not believe them, absent additional supporting
information. Further, the Court's skepticism with respect to certain
factual allegations derives from their worldview and perspective as
societal elites with various presumptions regarding the conduct of other
members of the dominant or governing class, particularly when opposed
by members of social out-groups. Beyond that, Iqbal also gives us a whiff
of the duplicity of the Justices in the Iqbal majority and their true
approach to judging at the Supreme Court level. Popular myth regarding
the role of Supreme Court Justices holds that they are to be like
umpires-simply calling balls and strikes-not making the rules. ''.Judges
should interpret the law, not make the law" is the partisan mantra offered
in supposed contradistinction to the notion of the "activist" judge, who
molds the law as she sees fit to suit her own substantive aspirational ends.
Well, in Iqba� we see the Justices offering their own version of activism in
service of what can only be surmised to be their own hostility to litigation
in general, and challenges to government authority in particular. That is
unfortunate, but not new. But so long as decisions like Iqbal are
recognized for what they are-subversions of law to achieve the restrictive
ends of societal elites-there is some hope that the complete slide toward
restrictive procedure can be abated and avoided.
85

See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate
Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 947,

949 (2002). "Appellate courts are indeed more favorable to defendants than are trial
judges and juries. . . . [T]he defendants' advantage grew as the case better fit the
format of little victim against big defendant, just as it grew when the case had been
decided by a jury. We found these tendencies in personal injury cases, as well as in
cases involving nongovernmental, noncorporate, nonforeign, and in-state plaintiffs.
These tendencies supported our theory that the appellate courts were striving to
undo trial level favoritism toward plaintiffs, which the appellate judges were
imagining." Id. But see Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliot, Beware of Numbers (and
Unsupported Claims ofJudicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002).
• See, e.g., Karen Blumenthal, How I Got Burned uy Beanie Babies, WALL ST. j., Aug.
26, 2009, at DI. "More than three years after the crash of 1929, a Senate investigation
unveiled one jaw-dropping misbehavior after another. The head of Chase National
Bank had been selling his own bank's stock short while publicly urging others to buy.
The former chief of National City Bank-now Citigroup--was secretly receiving a
huge annual salary in retirement. Senate investigator Ferdinand Pecora called it 'a
shocking disclosure of low standards in high places."' Id.

